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9. American macromanagement issues 
and policy 
Joseph P. Daniels and John B. Davis 
INTRODUCTION 
Technological gains, advances in communications, and lower transportation 
costs, combined with trade liberalization efforts of post-war multilateral in-
stitutions, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
as well as regional and unilateral actions, have increasingly opened nations to 
trade and capital flows creating a dynamic global market-place. Though 
liberalization has faced numerous obstacles and advanced at an uneven pace, 
it has advanced. As illustrated in Figure 9.1, over the last two decades world 
trade in goods and services has grown in excess of an annual average rate of 5 
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per cent. In the early 1990s, in spite of a US economy in recession and 
stagnant European economies, the volume of world trade increased at a rate 
of 3 per cent or more each year, and by the middle 1990s it approached 
double digits. Oue to the Asian financial crises of 1997, projections for 
growth of world trade are much smaller than the actual rates of the middle 
1990s, yet they still are positive and in excess of 3 per cent a year. 
Even the United States, the largest individual economy, has become more 
dependent on and integrated with foreign markets. As pointed out by John 
Kirton in Chapter 2, this has occurred even though most Americans, 56 per 
cent versus 37 per cent according to a recent poll conducted by the Angus 
Reid Group (The Economist, 1999, and as cited by Kirton, Chapter 2), view 
protectionism over free trade as best for US prosperity. In Chapter 1, Figure 
1.1, Pryor examines the extent of globalization of the US real sector using 
exports and imports as a per cent of GOP Focusing on the evidence for the 
last two decades we see that, following the depreciation of the US dollar from 
its historic high valuation in 1985, imports relative to GOP have increased 
from approximately 10 per cent to over 13 per cent and exports relative to 
GDP have increased from approximately 7.25 per cent to 12 per cent. As we 
point out later in this chapter, however, this type of measure is likely to 
underestimate the extent of globalization as it masks the increased trade in 
intermediate goods and inputs that reflects companies' decisions to outsource 
increasing amounts of their production processes. 
The increasing integration of the United States economy into the world 
economy at the end of the 20th century none the less needs to be understood 
in part within the context of US domestic economic policy issues. The USA, 
like Japan, combines a large domestic economy with a ratio of trade to GOP 
that is small compared to other OECD countries. This means that domestic 
economic issues are generally the primary concern of policy-makers, and that 
trade policy questions are often fonnulated in terms of domestic issues. This 
focus is sometimes overlooked on account of the strong commitment on the 
part of the USA since World War II to a liberal international trading order. 
But most individuals who come to playa role in US policy-making towards 
the international economy first spend years being involved in debates over 
domestic economic questions, and this later plays a role in framing their 
thinking about international economic policy. 
In this chapter, we describe some of the macroeconomic challenges facing 
the American economy at the end of the 20th century that result from increas-
ing globalization. We focus on issues that tend to reflect the special position 
of the USA in the world economy today, rather than issues shared with other 
OECD countries, in order to specifically describe how the American 
macroeconomy may differ from other countries and, therefore, how US 
macromanagement strategies differ. In particular, this chapter offers an ex-
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amination of a specific concern in the issue areas of balance of payments and 
exchange rate management, monetary policy, fiscal policy and trade policy. 
Hence, the first of these issues are by nature macroeconomic in the usual 
sense of the term, while others are more microeconomic in nature. Our main 
example of the former concerns the inconsistent attention given to the ex-
change value of the dollar. Because the US government is able to finance 
deficit spending solely in dollars, US budget policy has often been carried out 
without attention to the consequences of changes in the dollar's value. We 
also consider the euro's challenge to US dollar hegemony and the spillover 
effects of US monetary policy. 
Our main example of the latter concerns the relatively high degree of 
decentralization and flexible character of US labour markets . Though changes 
in US labour markets, specifically in regard to wage dispersion and inequal-
ity, may be largely caused by forces independent of globalization, they are 
none the less perceived by many people in the USA as being related to the 
integration of the USA into the world economy. Here, in contrast to a past 
policy of neglect towards the value of the dollar at the macro level, there may 
be a tendency for policy-makers to become preoccupied with the connection 
between trade and income. The intensity of the debate over NAFTA is an 
illustration of this . To the extent that falling wages for low-skilled workers 
requires trade adjustment assistance, there are implications for fiscal policy. 
Hence, fiscal solutions are necessary in order to avoid pressure to use 
second-best commercial policies. 
In this chapter we thus examine four important economic challenges faced 
by US policy-makers that fit in the issue areas of balance-of-payment, ex-
change rate, monetary policy and fiscal policy management, and that result 
from globalization of the US economy. We begin in the next section by 
considering the implications of exchange rate movements for US industries 
and US balance-of-payments performance and then tum to the question of 
whether the USA ought to adopt a unified policy toward exchange rate 
management. The next section considers the issue of spill-over effects of US 
monetary policies on foreign economies, concentrating on the case of Mexico. 
The section after that examines the fiscal challenges that result from reduced 
seigniorage revenues due to the birth of the euro. The penultimate section 
turns from macro to micro, and considers the distribution of welfare gains 
from increased trade liberalization and the inequality of income resulting. 
The final section offers conclusions regarding the overall character and direc-
tion of American macromanagement in a period of increasing globalization. 
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CURRENT ACCOUNT AND THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR 
Randall Henning (1994) describes US exchange rate policy, in contrast to 
Gennan and Japanese policy, as having been less consistent over time -
evolving through cycles of neglect and activism - and less conscious of the 
competitive ramifications of currency valuation. Recently, US Secretary Robert 
Rubin 's approach to exchange rate policy was described as 'intervening in 
currency markets rarely, but like a ton of bricks when he does' (Hirsh, 1997). 
Henning argues that in the United States, the private sector is 'fractionalized' 
and therefore is unable to communicate a clear preference for external mon-
etary and exchange rate policy. If the private sector could demonstrate a clear 
preference on exchange rate policy, then that preference could anchor policy 
and lend it continuity. 
Figure 9.2 illustrates the nominal and real effective exchange values (trade 
weighted) of the US dollar for the past two decades, and thus reveals the 
currency instability that results from inconsistent policies. From 1981 to 
1985, the dollar made a remarkable run, reaching unprecedented highs in 
both nominal and real value. The cause of the rise was primarily a mismatch 
of domestic monetary and fiscal policies and a mismatch of US policies with 
its major trading partners. Monetary policy was tight in order to stamp out 
inflation and fiscal policy was loose, with tax cuts combined with structural 
deficits resulting from increased defence spending. Both actions caused nomi-
nal and real US interest rates to skyrocket, attracting foreign capital inflows 
and causing the dollar to appreciate. 
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Figure 9.3 US dollar effective exchange value: nominal and real, 1980-98 
As shown in Figure 9.3 the dollar appreciation reversed a modest surplus at 
the beginning of the 1980s and the current account deficit eventually widened 
to over 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1987 before declining following the deprecia-
tion of the dollar in 1987. The late 1980s to the mid-1990s was a period of 
general depreciation of the dollar and a decline of the US current account 
deficit, until 1992 when the deficit began to widen again.' With a strengthen-
ing US economy, the dollar began to appreciate again in the mid-1990s. The 
current account deficit widened as well, and was magnified by the collapse of 
the East Asian economies in late 1997. 
Interpreting the Current Account Deficit 
The principal problem with an appreciating dollar and a widening current 
account deficit is that they often lead to cries for protection from cheap 
imports and unfair pricing from abroad. Hence, the deficit provides political 
'cover' for policy-makers who choose to pursue second-best policies of trade 
protection as opposed to less popular macroeconomic strategies. Higgins and 
Klitgaard (1998) argue, however, that from a macroeconomic perspective the 
mounting current account deficit need not necessarily mean lower employ-
ment levels overall. Lower domestic employment in specific sectors may 
indeed result from higher end-use imports. This, however, can be offset by 
the employment generated by the inflow of job-creating foreign capital into 
the United States. The evidence summarized by the authors indicates that US 
multinationals produce more than $500 billion in goods and services abroad 
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annually rather than producing them in the United States. On the other hand, 
in 1997 alone the United States was the recipient of $255 billion in net 
investment inflows. In addition, the use of imported inputs may allow firms to 
shift their capacity from low profit margin operations at the front of the 
production process to higher profit margin operation nearer the end of the 
production process, thereby raising wages. This is evident in the steel indus-
try where, during the 1980s, US firms reduced their capacity for manufacturing 
slab steel and increased their capacity for rolled finished steel products by 
relying on imported slab steel. 
The relationship between a current account deficit and capital inflows can 
be better understood in terms of the national income and production ac-
counts. By definition, the current account CA equals the sum of the gap 
between domestic private saving S and private domestic investment I and the 
gap between taxes T and government spending G - the fiscal balance (T - G) 
- expressed as 
CA = (S - J) + (T - G). (9.1) 
Additionally, domestic private saving is equivalent to the sum of private 
domestic investment spending, the fiscal balance, and the accumulation of 
foreign financial assets FA, 
S = I + (G - 1) + FA. (9.2) 
Combining the two equations, it is shown that the current account balance -
which equals the difference between private and public savings and private 
investment spending - is equal to the accumulation of foreign assets, 
CA = S + (T - G) - I = FA. (9.3) 
Hence, if private saving exceeds the sum of private investment spending 
and the fiscal deficit, a current account surplus results and the nation is 
accumulating foreign assets. If, on the other hand, domestic private saving 
does not match private domestic investment and the fiscal deficit, a current 
account deficit results and the nation borrows from abroad. 
Currently, US private saving is not sufficient to meet desired domestic 
private investment, which is job creating. The fall in private saving and the 
rise in domestic private investment necessitates the inflow of foreign capital. 
As argued by Higgins and Klitgaard (1998, p. 4), therefore, the current account 
deficit can be viewed as ' a reflection of the need for foreign capital to sustain 
the economy'. By viewing the current account deficit as a macroeconomic 
outcome, we can conclude that, in general terms, policy-makers have two 
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options in reducing the need for foreign capital inflows (other than reducing 
domestic private investment which would be undesirable): stimulate private 
saving and/or reduce the fiscal deficit. In the United States actions have been 
taken in both areas. The deficit has been reduced and it appears a true surplus 
may result for the next fiscal year. Policy actions to increase domestic saving, 
however, have been unsuccessful. For the third quarter of 1998, the US 
personal saving rate turned negative for the first time since the 1930s and, 
according to calculations by J.P. Morgan, the private saving rate has declined 
to its lowest level ever, with investment and consumption spending exceeding 
income by more than 4 per cent of GDP (The Economist, 1998). Obviously 
further attention by economists and policy-makers is needed in this area. 
Because the current account deficit is large and persistent, it implies very 
large levels of debt. Large levels of foreign debt may affect the creditworthi-
ness of a nation and impinge on its ability to finance investment via 
international capital markets. According to Humpage (1998, p. 2) 'the mere 
existence of these debts indicates neither profligacy nor an unstable situa-
tion'. What is important is whether a nation can service its debt. By the 
rnid-1990s, the level of net international debt as a share of GDP for the 
United States was the third largest of all the G7 economies, yet US interna-
tional debt only amounts to 16 per cent of GDP. Humpage concludes, therefore, 
that under current circumstances the United states could remain a net debtor 
forever. 
In addition to the creditworthiness issues, large levels of foreign debt, in 
the long run, may mean either a reduced standard of living for future genera-
tions who have to repay the debt, or an increased standard of living if the 
capital inflows are invested in a manner that spurs future productivity gains. 
What is important here is whether the foreign capital inflows finance current 
consumption or investment. One way of determining this is to see if invest-
ment spending has increased with the capital inflows. In an early study of this 
issue, Faust (1989) claims that investment spending was unchanged during 
the 1980s. Based on more recent data though, Hakkio (1995) argues that US 
investment spending actually declined after 1992. Hence, the impact of the 
large and persistent current account deficits on future living standards re-
mains somewhat unclear and yet the employment consequences appear to be 
less than desirable. 
Industry Level Effects of Exchange Rate Movements 
Henning 's hypothesis on the fractionalization of American businesses in 
regard to currency valuation is perhaps best explained by the uneven effects 
of currency movements on profit and performance across industries and 
firms . The effects of currency movements on profitability and performance 
American macromanagement issues and policy 197 
depend upon the degree of globalization of a particular industry. The typi-
cal measure of the extent of industry openness is the total of import and 
export sales as a per cent of domestic production (import plus export 
revenue divided by domestic production revenues). This particular meas-
ure, however, only considers the revenue and market share aspects of currency 
movements. As argued by Campa and Goldberg (1997), foreign shocks that 
impinge upon a domestic industry because of that industry's dependence on 
export sales and exposure to import competition can be offset in part by the 
use of imported inputs in the domestic production process. In other words, 
the effect on revenues may be offset by lower costs of imported inputs. The 
importance of intra-industry trade is incorporated in the creative approach 
to measuring globalization by Makhija and Williamson, Chapter 5 in this 
volume. 
Campa and Goldberg calculate four different measures to determine the 
extent of globalization and 'external orientation' of an industry, that is, the 
degree to which an industry may be affected by foreign shocks, such as a 
dramatic currency swing. The authors' four measures, provided in Table 9.1, 
are: export share, the ratio of industry export revenues to industry shipments; 
import share, the ratio of imports to consumption; imported input share, 
imported inputs as a share of the value of production; and net external 
orientation, the difference between industry export share and imported input 
share. The measures, provided for 20 industry classifications, show that some 
industries, such as industrial machinery and instruments and related products, 
can be adversely affected by a dollar appreciation as they rely heavily on 
export revenues as indicated by a high export share. Industries such as leather 
products, petroleum products and printing and publishing are likely to benefit 
from a dollar appreciation as their export share is low relative to their use of 
imported inputs. Still others yet, such as transportation equipment and pri-
mary metal products, are likely to be little affected even though their export 
share is relatively high. This is because their imported input share is high as 
well and a dollar appreciation will lower the cost of imported inputs and 
offset the lower export revenues. 
Subsequent empirical work by Goldberg and Crockett (1998) shows that 
producer profits and investment spending are likely to be hurt by a dollar 
appreciation in industries where the measure of external orientation is high. 
In regard to wages, the 1995 dollar appreciation constrained wages consider-
ably in the chemicals, industrial machinery, electronic equipment and 
instruments industries: four of five industries with the highest net external 
orientation measures. The authors also find that in the mid-1980s - when the 
net orientation for US manufacturing was less than 2 per cent - a 10 per cent 
rise in the value of the dollar resulted in a 2.4 per cent average decline in the 
investment rate of manufacturing industries while in 1995 - when the net 
Table 9.1 External orientation 
Export Import Imported input External Industry 
Category share share share orientation integration 
Food and kindred products 5.9 4.2 4.2 1.7 10.1 
Tobacco products 14.9 0.6 2.1 12.8 17 
Textile mill products 7.6 9.1 7.3 0.3 14.9 
Apparel and other textiles 7.4 31.4 3.2 4.2 10.6 
Lumber and wood products 7.6 10.3 4.3 3.3 11.9 
Furniture and fixtures 5.5 14.1 5.7 -0.2 11.2 
Paper and allied products 9 10 6.3 2.7 15.3 
Printing and publishing 2.4 1.6 3.5 -1.1 5.9 
...... Chemicals and allied products 15.8 11 6.3 9.5 22.1 
'0 
00 Petroleum and coal products 3.9 5.7 5.3 - 1.4 9.2 
Rubber and miscellaneous products 9.2 12.8 5.3 3.9 14.5 
Leather and leather products 14.4 59.5 20.5 -6.1 34.9 
Stone, clay and glass products 5.6 9.5 4.7 0.9 10.3 
Primary metal products 11.2 17.4 10.6 0.6 21.8 
Fabricated metal products 7.9 8.5 8.7 -0.8 16.6 
Industrial machinery and equipment 25 .8 27.8 11 14.8 36.8 
Electronic and other electric equipment 24.2 32.5 11.6 12.6 35.8 
Transportation equipment 17.8 24.3 15.7 2.1 33.5 
Instruments and related products 21.3 20.1 6.3 15 27.6 
Other manufacturing 13.5 41.1 9.9 3.6 23.4 
Total manufacturing 13.4 16.3 8.2 5.2 21.6 
Source: Campa and Goldberg (1997) . 
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orientation rate exceeded 5 per cent - the same appreciation resulted in a 6 
per cent drop in investment spending. 
The measures of Campa and Goldberg can also be used to show the 
increasing dependence of US industries on the foreign markets. Figure 9.4 
charts the changes in the four measures and a measure of our own, which we 
label industry integration. This last measure adds the export share and im-
ported input share to show the overall, as opposed to net, orientation of US 
manufacturing industries. Hence, it intends to show the extent of globaliza-
tion of US manufacturers. Over the three sample periods the measure of 
industry integration rose 73 per cent, from 12.5 per cent to 21.6 per cent. For 
all of the measures, the only decline over the entire period is the decline in 
the export share during the dramatic dollar appreciation of 1985. None the 
less, the export share has increased by 60 per cent over the last three decades. 
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As is also shown in Figure 9.4, the large increase in the export share over 
the last three decades generated a 21 per cent increase in the net external 
orientation measure. This is of importance because it means that US manu-
facturing industries are becoming more sensitive to dollar appreciations. This 
implies that for most industries when the dollar appreciates, export revenue 
losses will exceed input cost savings. Hence, exchange rate policy has be-
come more important and US industries should express their concerns and 
preferences for a stable dollar policy. 
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SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF US MONETARY POLICY 
The previous section concluded with evidence of the increasing globalization 
of US industries. As the US economy becomes increasingly more integrated 
with foreign economies, and as developing and emerging economies continue 
to manage their currency values relative to the US dollar, channels for spillover 
effects of US exchange rate and monetary policies on foreign economies are 
strengthened. Monetary policy actions, therefore, can affect the exchange and 
interest rates of trading partners and investor attitudes towards these econo-
mies. Hence, the macroeconomic and financial situations of strategically 
important partners must be considered. 
It is reported that the Federal Reserve was inclined to increase interest 
rates in late 1997, but decided against it because of the fear that it would 
further destabilize international markets (Obstfeld, 1998). More recently 
Argentina has floated the notion of dollarization of their economy. In regard 
to this, the Wall Street Journal (18 January 1999, p. AI) reported that it 
'doesn't much matter to the Fed, given that it already has to worry about the 
international ramifications of anything it does'. It does not appear, however, . 
that the Federal Reserve was as cognizant of the international dimensions 
of its actions in 1994. In this section we consider an example of the impor-
tance of these international dimensions: the 1994 collapse of the Mexican 
peso. 
From 1992 through the first quarter of 1994, Mexico enjoyed rather robust 
international investment flows to its economy. During 1994, however, Mexico 
endured a political assassination, the Chiapas uprising and a burgeoning 
deficit. As if that were not enough, as investors became nervous about the 
political and economic environment the US Federal Reserve acted to pre-
empt domestic inflation by raising interest rates . To the surprise of many 
market participants (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Annual Report, 
p. 16), the Fed increased the Fed Funds Rate by 2.5 percentage points and the 
discount rate by 1.75 percentage points over the course of the year. As capital 
flows reversed, Mexican authorities acted to maintain the crawling peg ex-
change rate arrangement that was in place at the time. Reserves were quickly 
drawn down and a devaluation was attempted in December 1994. A complete 
loss of confidence in the peso caused the arrangement to be abandoned in 
favour of a floating rate system. 
A number of empirical studies have concluded that US interest rates have a 
significant, perhaps even greater than one-to-one, impact on eme~ing mar-
kets (see Frankel and Okongwu, 1995, for a summary of the evidence). 
Figure 9.5 attempts to illustrate the impact of US interest rate increases on 
the Mexican exchange rate arrangement. (It is impossible to separate the 
political assassination with the second interest rate increase as they differ by 
18 
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a single day.) Figure 9.5 plots the one-month and three-month rates on peso-
denominated government debt and marks the date and size of increases in the 
Federal Funds Rate. As seen in the figure, there is, in general, an associated 
increase in Mexican interest rates or sustained high rates following an in-
crease in the Federal Funds rate. 
Given the political and economic costs associated with the bail-out monies 
provided to Mexico in 1995, the Fed and the Treasury have become much 
more aware of the international dimensions of their actions. The question 
then becomes: what does this additional responsibility mean for policy-making? 
Surely it must bring greater stability to the deliberative policy process, not 
less stability. Further, the potential for policy cooperation and coordination 
must be considered. Currently the views of the Federal Reserve and the US 
Treasury revealed in responses to a proposed target zone arrangement for the 
euro, dollar and yen, and the consideration of dollarizing developing econo-
mies, indicate that the United States will encourage cooperation and 
consultation but not coordination of policies. 
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THE EURO: CHALLENGE TO US DOLLAR HEGEMONY 
AND SEIGNIORAGE REVENUES 
Another linkage between US fiscal policy and the unique position of the 
dollar is that of seigniorage. Along with the launch of the euro in January 
1999, much speculation has been offered in regard to the challenge to the US 
dollar hegemony. To be sure, many of the wishes for euro supremacy are 
political in nature. If the euro does challenge the international use of the 
dollar, there are economic ramifications as well. In particular, a government 
that issues fiat money eams seigniorage revenues: that is, the government 
profits on the difference between the market value of the currency and the 
cost of actually issuing the currency. There are two principle ways that a 
govemment can generate seigniorage revenues: by printing money and by 
inflating the economy. For the United States, only the first is relevant today. 
It is indeed true that seigniorage revenues are a small portion - approxi-
mately 3 per cent of overall federal government revenues. None the less, 
the US Treasury estimates that annual seigniorage revenues for the United 
States are between $13 and $16 billion a year. A currency that could 
challenge dollar hegemony could therefore reduce these sizable seigniorage 
revenues. 
Tavlas (1998) provides the most recent survey data on the international 
uses of currencies. The data, as shown in Table 9.2, compares the US economy 
and uses of the dollar with all 15 EU members in aggregate. Though the two 
economies are relatively the same in terms of share of world GDP and share 
of world exports, the dollar is dominant in terms of its use as a vehicle 
currency (use in world trade), in developing country debt and as a reserve 
currency. Though the European currencies represent three times the turnover 
of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, the dollar is still the dominant 
single currency and turns over more than twice that of the next currency, the 
Deutsche Mark. 
If the euro were to replace all EU member country currencies overnight, it 
still would not be a considerable rival to the dollar in international markets. 
Tavlas argues, however, that with time the euro will be more stable than any 
individual European currency as it will denominate all inter-EU trade, Euro-
pean financial markets will deepen and more euro-denominated assets will be 
issued and the European Central Bank will likely establish its own anti-inflation 
credentials. Hence, the euro will be needed to properly diversify portfolios 
and may offer an alternative safe-haven currency. In a static environment, it is 
likely, therefore, that the euro will challenge dollar hegemony in time. As the 
proposed dollarization of Argentina shows, however, the world is dynamic 
and not static, and the importance of the dollar is growing in other areas of 
the world, not shrinking. 
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Table 9.2 United States and European Union: relative size and use of 
currencies (%) 
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United States European Union 
Economic size 
Share of World GDP, 1996 
Share of World Exports, 1996 
Use of currencies 
World Trade, 1995 
International Bond Offerings, Sept. 1997 
Developing Country Debt, year-end 1996 
Global Foreign Exchange Reserves, 
year-end 1996 
Foreign Exchange Transactions, 
April 1995 
Source: Tavlas (1998). 
20.7 
15.2 
51.0 
45.1 
50.2 
63.7 
11.5 
GLOBALIZATION AND WAGE INEQUALITY 
20.4 
14.7 
31.0 
41.9 
15.8 
19.5 
35.0 
A domestic economic issue particularly central to US experience that has 
gained greater attention in the 1990s is the issue of income inequality and 
globalization. The central question is whether increasing trade integration causes 
or is exacerbating income inequality in the USA. That real income - or wage -
inequality has increased since the 1970s and especially the 1980s is clear 
(Gottschalk, 1997). Increased income inequality in the USA is currently under-
stood largely in tenns of increased wage inequality, since it is difficult to model 
the processes leading to changes in the distribution of family income, and since 
labour economists have well-developed tools with which to analyse changes in 
the relative demand and supply of low and less skilled labour. Thus among the 
results of recent research is that changes in mean wage differences between 
education groups, as reflected in the high school-college premium, and be-
tween experience groups explain much of recent increased inequality. The 
standard interpretation is that labour market forces are driving up the price of 
skills, adversely affecting high school graduates and those individuals less 
insulated from market forces by seniority or union coverage. This consequent 
relative decline in the demand for low and less skilled labour relative to skilled 
labour has undermined both employment and wages of the fonner. 
Note that this issue particularly confronts the USA on account of generally 
greater wage flexibility in its labour markets as compared to most other 
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OECO countries - with the possible exception of Canada and the UK 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Most OECO countries have more central-
ized wage-setting institutions that have permitted them to escape or moderate 
worldwide trends toward greater income inequality. In addition, they have 
also relied in recent years more than the USA on tax and transfer systems to 
offset changes in labour market outcomes where these did tend to produce 
substantial increases in earnings inequality. This difference indicates that the 
issue of wage and income inequality not only places special burdens on the 
USA vis-a.-vis its primary trading partners, but especially does so if an impor-
tant source of this inequality is understood by the public to be the increased 
global integration of the American economy. 
Globalization and Wage Inequality: the Evidence 
In fact, it is probably not the case that the principal cause of this development 
is increased integration of the US economy through trade. Most research 
indicates that technological change in the USA since the 1980s has been 
biased against low-skilled workers, boosting the productivity and wages of 
the better educated, and that trade has been at best a secondary cause of 
increased wage inequality (see, for example, Johnson, 1997). Thus in ad-
dressing the possible impact of trade on wage and income inequality the 
research of Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Berman et al. (1994) pro-
ceeds on the assumption that declines in employment and wages for low-skilled 
workers are due to within-industry shifts in labour demand due to changes in 
technology, and that trade operates on inequality only indirectly through 
between-industry shifts in labour demand. This view that trade plays a lesser 
role is consistent with the fact that the level of merchandise trade relative to 
GOP is not high for the USA relative to other industrialized countries. 
There are good reasons, however, for thinking that this measure of trade 
integration may not fully explain the effects of globalization on US employ-
ment and wages. First, the rising share of services in GOP and in trade 
suggests the need for caution in relying on the merchandise share, particu-
larly since trade in services seems to favour higher skilled workers. Second, 
focusing on the final goods share masks increased trade in intermediate 
goods and inputs which reflects companies' decisions to outsource increasing 
amounts of their production processes to take advantage of low-wage labour 
in other countries. In this case, international trade not only affects labour 
demand through inter-industry shifts, but trade also affects demand for labour 
within industries as well, so that globalization arguably plays a more impor-
tant role than previously thought. We emphasize this latter issue here, since 
most critics of the idea that increased openness of the US economy is respon-
sible for increased income inequality cite the size of the tradeable goods 
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sector as simply being too small to have an impact (for example, Johnson, 
1997).2 
Outsourcing may be generally understood as the disintegration of the 
traditional vertically integrated production process, such as characterized 
Fordist development of manufacturing in the USA in the 20th century, through 
an increased outsourcing that combines manufacturing or service activities 
done abroad with those done domestically. In response to opportunities for 
low-cost production across countries, intermediate inputs may cross borders 
multiple times before they are marketed as final goods. An important dimen-
sion of this process is that independent firms may produce, sell and resell 
intermediate inputs before final goods emerge under corporate brand names 
sold in the USA. Thus while the final goods producer with consumer brand 
name identification and developed marketing structures ends up being re-
sponsible for a lengthy, cross-nation, cross-firm 'value chain ', it does so by 
relying on contractual arrangements with independent firms in production 
locations around the world to increase its flexibility and enhance profitability. 
One problem with gaining a better understanding of trade in intermediate 
inputs is in finding a measure of outsourcing. The strategy of Lawrence 
(1994) and Krugman (1995) is to focus on multinational firms, the former 
using imports of US multinationals as a measure of outsourcing, and the 
latter arguing in terms of flows of foreign direct investment through multina-
tional firms. But a focus on the internal operations of multinational firms 
alone is not likely to provide a broad enough perspective on outsourcing to be 
representative of the general situation for the American economy, since 
outsourcing may involve independent companies selling and reselling 
semi-finished goods in a larger overall ' value chain'. Feenstra (1998, p. 36) 
consequently adopts a more general definition of outsourcing that 'in addi-
tion to imports specifically by US multinationals, includes all imported 
intermediate or final goods that are used in the production of an American 
firm, or sold under its brand name'. 
To construct a data series that reflects the full range of industries and 
activities included within outsourcing, Feenstra (1998) follows Irwin (1996) 
in examining what has happened to the composition of US trade using Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis 'end-use' categories that assign goods by purchasers 
rather than production processes, and this is provided in Table 9.3 below. As 
shown in Table 9.3, across five major categories in which the bulk of trade 
has historically occurred, the record shows the USA shifting away from 
agriculture and raw materials and toward manufactured goods. Particularly 
significant is the fact that the share of capital plus consumer goods together 
have increased from 10 per cent of imports and 15 per cent of exports in 1925 
to over 50 per cent in 1990. This suggests that what may be termed processed 
manufactured goods (some of which are sold directly to consumers and some 
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Table 9.3 Shares of us exports and imports by end-use categories (%) 
Category 1925 1950 1965 1980 1995 
Foods, feeds and Imports 21.9 30.0 19.1 11.3 5.0 
beverages Exports 18.7 15.5 19.2 16.9 9.2 
Industrial supplies and Imports 68.2 62.4 53.3 31.3 18.2 
materials Exports 59.8 45.5 34.8 32.2 25.6 
Capital goods (except Imports 0.4 1.3 7.1 19.0 33.6 
autos) Exports 8.7 22.4 31.4 35.0 42.4 
Consumer goods Imports 9.4 6.1 16.0 21.5 24.3 
(except autos) Exports 6.0 8.9 7.0 7.8 11.7 
Automotive vehicles Imports 0.02 0.3 4.5 16.9 18.9 
and parts Exports 6.8 7.8 7.5 8.1 11.2 
Source : Feenstra (1998). 
of which will receive additional value added by American firms) now play an 
increasingly important role in US trade, and that more products are being 
imported into the USA at various stages of processing. 
To further investigate this hypothesis, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) consider 
the ratio of imported to domestic intermediate inputs for US manufacturing 
industries, and find that imported inputs have increased from 5.7 per cent of 
total intermediate purchases in 1972 to 13.9 per cent in 1990. Similar calcula-
tions by Campa and Goldberg (1997) for Canada, Japan, the UK and the USA 
show a doubling of the share of imported inputs for the USA between 1975 
and 1995 for all manufacturing. Hummels et al. (1997), who use the tenn 
'vertical specialization' to describe a country' s specialization in particular 
segments of the value chain, also find the USA to have higher values of 
vertical specialization in 1990 as compared to 1970. 
Policy Implications 
Further research on the impact of outsourcing on wages still needs to be done, 
but there is enough evidence to suggest that outsourcing may contribute to a 
reduction in relative demand for low-skilled labour in developed countries 
beyond what trade in final goods contributes. How important, then, is this 
connection between globalization and wage ineqUality? Perhaps representative 
of the general view on the effects of trade per se is Richardson (1995, p. 51): 
'My own reading of this research is that trade is a moderate contributing source 
of income inequality trends; it may not overshadow other sources, but it cannot 
be shrugged away.' Taken together with the additional impact of outsourcing, 
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this suggests that Americans are likely to place pressure on policy-makers to 
somehow protect those affected adversely by increasing integration. But the 
situation is more complicated. Recognizing that those production activities lost 
by more developed countries are typically gained by less developed countries, 
and that outsourced activities are low skilled, labour intensive for developed 
countries and high skilled, labour intensive for developing countries, we see 
that outsourcing raises the average skill-intensity of production in both loca-
tions, and assists the general tendency toward factor price equalization with 
respect to wages between developed and developing countries that trade in final 
goods involves. Thus, lying in the balance for policy-makers with increasing 
US wage inequality is the prospect of increasing wage equality in low-income 
US trading partners. Were this to help move developing economies towards the 
size of developed economies, according to the arguments of Hummels· and 
Levinsohn (1995), we might expect an even faster growth of world trade with 
the prospect of rapidly increasing gains from trade. These possibilities suggest 
that policy-makers will be disinclined to adopt second-best initiatives that 
attempt to 'tame trade', and will rather favour 'first-best' strategies for compen-
sating those possibly affected by the economy's greater openness.3 
In welfare and efficiency terms, this might first be formulated in terms of 
Corden's (1997) 'conservative social welfare function' that precludes signifi-
cant reductions in real income of important sections of the community through 
trade adjustment assistance directly targeted on those adversely affected by 
increasing trade integration. Using a labour economics perspective, a long-
run strategy to offset the reduction in demand for low-skilled workers through 
a parallel reduction in their supply is for government action to improve 
education and training. In the short run, subsidies to boost living standards of 
workers who take low-paying jobs may take the form of tax cuts, cash 
supplements to wages, improved public services and subsidies to employers 
to hire workers in non-traded services (Wood, 1994). An important problem 
is that in either case these policies in the USA would impose fiscal burdens at 
the federal level precisely at a time when federal budgets are being reduced 
rather than expanded, and when the majority of citizens are most concerned 
about anticipated funding shortfalls for social security and medicare. Indeed, 
from an intergenerational perspective on budgets rather than the traditional 
annual one normally taken, the fiscal liability for future social security and 
medicare benefits place the budget in deficit through the current 10 year 
projections.4 Thus, the USA appears to be operating with a federal 'budget 
constraint' that makes significant trade adjustment assistance unlikely, and 
one cannot consequently rule out the possibility that political pressures may 
build for protection. 
But might trade adjustment assistance somehow pay for itself? Phelps 
(1997) has recently argued that a wage subsidy directed at low-skilled work-
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ers might pay for itself through savings on social expenditures and increased 
tax revenues. Rather than revenue-neutral, such subsidies might be 
'revenue-positive', and actually help the USA address its future fiscal imbal-
ance. More research needs to be done to demonstrate the viability of this 
strategy if the USA is to resist popular demands for protecting low-skilled 
workers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Here we offer three broad conclusions about the nature and direction of 
American macromanagement in a period of globalization. First, it is impor-
tant to be aware of how the size and relative autonomy of the American 
economy tends to narrow the focus of policy-makers on domestic concerns. 
With respect to exchange rate and monetary policy, this is manifest in a not-
always benign neglect toward the impact of managing the value of the dollar 
on both domestic business and foreign economies. At the opposite extreme is 
a perhaps too strong concern with addressing wage inequality. In a society 
accustomed to thinking in domestic terms, the tendency to focus strictly on 
the American side of trade in the form of increasing wage dispersion pushes 
the experience in developing economies, their decreasing wage dispersion 
and possible increased gain from trade, out of view. 
Second, it is important to remember that the policy-making process always 
reflects a political balancing of competing interests, so that what may be the 
most rational policy in any given circumstance is less the point than what 
reconciling competing interests may achieve. Our argument in this connec-
tion is that having a unified exchange rate and monetary policy has been 
hobbled by the inability of competing interests to reach agreement about the 
value of the dollar. But the fractionalization of business interests, together 
with an increasing awareness of the effects on other countries of US policy, 
may now lead the USA toward a more consistent strategy towards the dollai, 
and one, moreover, that attempts to stabilize its value along with stabilizing 
prices. 
Third, our view is that first-best, non-protectionist policy that targets par-
ticular problems directly, as would wage subsidies for low-skilled workers, 
remains a consensus view among US policy-makers. This is not to say that 
protectionist thinking does not represent a danger in the USA. Rather it is to 
say that protectionist thinking is largely confined to industries, firms and 
sectors of the population interested in their own case alone, and does not 
constitute a view of the best interest of the country as a whole. Of course, 
enough voices adversely affected by trade in some circumstances can to-
gether constitute a majority. Whether this is prevented from happening may 
American macromanagement issues and policy 209 
depend in part on the success of trade adjustment policies that pay for 
themselves in a period of constrained fiscal budgets. 
NOTES 
I. The relatively small current account deficit of 1991 reflects a surplus in the unilateral 
transfers category that resulted from receipts from Gulf War allies. 
2. Another approach for estimating the effects of trade on labour markets, and thus showing a 
link between globalization and wage inequality, is the factor content approach used by 
Wood (1994). See Leamer (1994) for a critique of Wood's results. 
3. For a minority view favouring protection and trade barriers see Batra (1993). For an 
intermediate view recommending moderating the pace of globalization, see Rodrik (1997). 
4. In particular, it has been estimated that social security benefits promised to the working 
population today may exceed the taxes this population will pay for these benefits by seven 
to ten trillion dollars in present value terms (Feldstein, 1998). 
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